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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
PETE MOLETON,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, a corporation, and PACIFIC FRUIT EXPRESS COMPANY, a corporation,

Case No ..
7379

Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
PRELIMINARY STATEME'NT
This is a suit for personal injuries brought by Pete
Moleton, an employe of the Pacific Fruit Express Company,
against the Union Pacific Railroad Company and the Pacific Fruit Express Company. The first cause of action of
plaintiff's complaint proceeds upon the theory that Moleton's
right of recovery is predicated upon the Federal Employers'
Liability Act, 45 U. S. C. A., Sections 51 et seq. This is the
only cause of action of plaintiff's complaint material to this
appeal for reasons which will be hereinafter noted. For convenience the appellant Pete Moleton will be hereafter reSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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ferred to as the plaintiff; the respondent Union Pacific Rail-~~ 1
road Company will sometimes be referred to as the railroad ,)e5 °
company; and the respondent Pacific Fruit Express Com- :~ 8
pany will sometimes be referred to as the express company. ~on
We accept the statement of facts contained in plaintiff's :E~~
brief with the following exceptions :

;®001

te!P

At page 6 of his brief the plaintiff asserts in his state- ;~tlu
ment of facts that the argument on the motions to dismiss
plaintiff's complaint made by the defendants at the conclu- ;:~ge

sion of the plaintiff's case were almost entirely devoted to
the applicability of the Federal Employers' Liability Act. :!!tttl

This statement is true, but it is only fair to go further and J1fi]fia
point out that this. took place because plaintiff's attorneys J~oftl
conceded at the outset of the argument that they were of =~tE~
the opinion that the strongest theory in support of plain- ::"gooa
tiff's cause of action was dependent upon the applicability Jo~ri
of the Federal Employers' Liability Act. We wish to make ~!U!Xll
it clear that the defendants have always contended and now ~EX~!
reiterate that there is no lHtbility in this case even in the:~of I
event that the Federal Employers' Liability Act has applica- ~~lug-1
tion. This contention was thoroughly presented to the trial :nnat
court by the motions for nonsuit and by the argument there-Jinepl
on and will be discussed in this brief.
~inan
At page 10 of his brief the plaintiff asserts that it was Hffect
the responsibility of the express company to take care of the

work to be done on the refrigerator cars in the yards ahtiffJ
Laramie as disclosed by the information contained on the;~iou
switch list mentioned in plaintiff's brief and in the evidence.~nya1
If plaintiff intends to leave the inference that only such
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work as was mentioned in the switch list was done by
employes of the express company, then he is in error. The
evidence shows that the express company is a separate organization engaged in an independent business ; that other
work is performed by the employes of this company than is
mentioned in the switch list described in the evidence, and
that the express company engaged in similar work for other
railroads than the Union Pacific Railroad Company.
At page 15 of plaintiff's brief he asserts. that Moleton determined the presence of gas in bunkers of refrigerator cars
by the fact that he became dizzy when he got into fresh air.
It is significant to note that he did not become dizzy on the
occasion of the accident (R. 113). It appears that when the
plaintiff climbed out of car FDEX9084 from which he fell,
he felt "good", that he was not dizzy after working in the
first two cars which he reached in the train, and that he felt
the same upon reaching the fresh air after working the third
car; FDEX9084; and that he thought all gas had left the
bunkers of these cars because of the fact that he had
left the plugs open (R. 126, 112, 113, 114, 13·9'). It further
appears that the next thing the plaintiff can remember after
closing the plug on the third car is that he was lying on th~
ground in an injured condition. There is no factual evidence
to the effect that plaintiff suffered carbon monoxide poisoning.
? Plaintiff further asserts at page 16· of his brief that he

lost consciousness "when he got into the fresh air." No such
testimony appears in the record. The fact that Moleton does
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fu

not remember falling is no evidence that the plaintiff was
unconscious during the fall. Certainly one may search the
record in vain for testimony to the effect that Moleton became unconscious before the fall.

.1?1

:oour!

rei

It will be necessary for the defendants to add to plain- rul
tiff's statement of facts during the course of the argument wit
rer
contained in this brief. Such additions are not inconsistent !no
with the statement of facts given in plaintiff's brief, ex- me
cept as noted above. In such instances references to the rec- w1
wbB
ord will be given.
co

Only the first cause of action of plaintiff's complaint !~ij
is of any interest on this appeal. The plaintiff asserts at mff
IDa'·
pages 5 and 6 of his brief that he relies only upon his first than
cause of action. Apparently this was his real intention since Ern
his argument is addressed exclusively to the theory that oou
plaintiff made a jury question of liability under the Fed- effel
~llirl
eral Employers' Liability Act, which said act has no application to either the second or third causes of action contained
ilieil
in plaintiff's complaint. We assume, therefore, that assign- ~uch
ments of error Nos. 3, 4 and 5, contained at page 20 of plain- our,
tiff's brief are abandoned by plaintiff.
vie11
fue

In the case of Palfrey1'1W1Yt v. Bates & Rogers Const. Co.,
108 Utah 142, 158 P. (2) 132, this court said:

men

"We are favored with no citation of authority in ,fufue
the appellant's brief. This court does not look with 'ruleH
favor upon the cause of a litigant who raises points ioourt
and casts them in the lap of the court for research and
determination, and if this is done, it is within the
or
discretion of the court to refuse to consider them."

the
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~

In the case of Aiken v. Le:s Taylor Motor Crnnpany, 110
Utah 265, 171 P. (2) 676, Mr. Justice Wolfe, speaking for
the court, said :
"The assignment of error should not be a mere
repetitious itemization of practically all the acts and
rulings of the trial court which are set out by counsel
with the hope that one or more will be found to be
reversible error. Rather the assignment of error
should clearly and concisely inform the court and
the adverse party of the errors relied on for reversal
so that the court and the adverse party may know
what questions are to b~ raised in the appeal. Some
counsel make mass assignments of error (more than
180 in some cases) when only ten or fifteen would be
sufficient to raise all the real issues involved. Such
mass assignments are not helpful as they bury rather
than indicate and define the issues of the appeal.
Errors must be assigned but care and effort should
be taken to make those assignments so that they will
effectively serve the purpose for which they are required.
"We have searched appellants' brief in vain for
their assignment of errors set out and labelled as
such. Only a most liberal application of the rule and
our desire to give the appellants the benefit of areview prevents this appeal from being dismissed for
the reason that their brief does not contain a statement of the errors upon which they rely for reversal."
In the case of United States Building & Loam Ass'n. v.
Midvale H01ru~ Firmnce Corp., 86 Utah 506, 44 P. (2) 1090,
this court said :
"It is not pointed out in the unit holders' brief
or elsewhere wherein the evidence does not support
the questioned findings, nor wherein the evidence
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touching such findings may be found in the transcript. Under such circumstances the appeal of the
unit holders must be regarded as being prosecuted
solely upon the judgment roll."
We believe that this court should hold that assignments
of error Nos. 3, 4, and 5 are waived by the failure of the
plaintiff to submit any argument in support thereof; but
in any event we shall confine our answer to plaintiff's brief
to those issues which it properly presents, i. e. assignments
of error No. 1 and No.2. To go further and defend the ruling of the trial court attacked by assignments of error Nos.
3, 4 and 5 is impractical since neither the defendants nor
this court have any information as to the basis upon which
the plaintiff rests said assignments.
In support of his first two assignments of error the
plaintiff has divided his argument into four points, as set
forth on page 21 of his brief. We accept those four points as
the legal issues presented on this appeal; and our brief will
be addressed to the four propositions urged by plaintiff in
the same order as these arguments appear in plaintiff's brief.

AR,GUMENT
POINT NO. I
By Point No. I of his argument plaintiff contends that
the plaintiff was an employe of the defendant railroad company, in the following language: "The plaintiff, within
the meaning of the F. E. L. A., was employed by the defendant, Union Pacific Railroad Company, which admittedly
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was engaged as a common carrier by railroad in interstate
commerce." As stated by the plaintiff, we admit that the
defendant railroad company was engaged in interstate commerce as a common carrier by railroad. We deny that plaintiff was employed by the railroad company within the meaning of the F. E. L. A. Title 45, Section 51, United States
Code Annotated, provides, in so far as is material, as follows:
"Every common carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce between any of the several states
* * * shall be liable in damages to any person
suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier
in such commerce * * * for such injury * * *
resulting in whole or in part from ~he negligence of
any of the officers, agents or employees of such carrier * * *

"Any employee of a carrier, any part of whose
duties as such employee shall be the furtherance of
interstate or foreign commerce; or shall, in any way
directly or closely and substantially, affect such commerce as above set forth shall, for the purposes of
this chapter, be considered as being employed by such
carrier in such commerce and shall be considered as
entitled to the benefits of this chapter."
The words chosen by Congress to define the industrial relationship which invokes the application of the Federal Employers' Liability Act are, "while he is employed by such
carrier", and the further words, "any employee of a carrier."
Since the enactment of this s.tatute the courts have uniformly
refused to give any artificial meaning to the language above
referred to and have insisted that the'words "employee" and
"employed" are used in their common and usual sense.
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Robinson v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 237 U. S.
84, 3.5 Sup. Ct. 491, 5:9 L. Ed. 849. In this case suit w~
brought by a pullman porter against the Railroad Company
operating the train in which the pullman car where the
plaintiff worked was being transported. The Supreme Court
of the United States stated this principle in the following
language:
"We are of the opinion that Congress used the
words 'employee' and 'employed' in the statute in
their natural sense and intended to describe the conventional relation of employer and employee."
See also
Hull v. Philadelphia & Reading Ry. Co., 252 U.
S. 475, 40 Sup. Ct. 358, 64 L. Ed. 670;
Stevenson v. Lake Terminal Railroad Co., 42
Fed. (2) 35·7;
Reynolds v. Addison Miller Compmny, et al., 255
P. 110.
,
Plaintiff is therefore foreclosed from any support for his
argument upon the theory that the words "employee" or
"employed" have any special significance as used in the
Federal Employers' Liability Act. His relationship to the
Union Pacific Railroad Company must be determined on familiar principles. This factor alone should be conclusive
as to the question of the relationship between the plaintiff
and the Union Pacific Railroad Company in view of the evidence.
The facts as shown by the evidence and as admitted by
plaintiff's brief may be summarized as follows:
( 1) Moleton was originally hired by the Pacific
Fruit Express Company; (R. 72)
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(2) He worked for that same company approximately twenty years; (R. 72)
(3) His wages were exclusively paid by that
company; (R. 142)
( 4) He worked under the direct supervision of
employes of that company with no supervision by any employe of the Union Pacific
Railroad Company; (R. 141, 142, 144, 226,
227)

(5) His rate of pay was determined by that company; (R. 142)
(6) His methods of performing the work were
governed by rules of that company, as for
example, the safety rules mentioned in the
evidence ; (Ex. 4)
(7) He acquired seniority rights on his job with
Pacific Fruit Express Company; (R. 124)
(8) Pacific Fruit Express Company is an independent business engaged in performing services for various railroad carriers, which
has been in existence since the year 1906 ;
(R. 254, 255, 256)
f

(9) The only instructions which are given Pacific Fruit Express Company by the Union
Pacific Railroad Company in the performance of the Heater Protective Service (the
type of work in which Moleton was engaged when injured) are switch lists whereby the orders of the shipper relating to the
character of the service desired are transmitted. (R. 22'6, 227.)
Under these circumstances, to contend that Moleton was
an employe of the Union Pacific Railroad Company is so
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obviously a strained interpretation of the words "employee"
and "employed" as to plainly conflict with the principle laid
down in the Robinson case, supra.
In the recent case of Gaulden v. Southern Pa.cific Co.
the identical proposition now urged by plaintiff was presented to the federal courts. In that case Gaulden was employed by the same Pacific F'ruit Express Company with the
same kind of job as Moleton. He was injured at Bakersfield,
California while engaged as an iceman unloading ice from
a refrigerator car belonging to the Express Company. The
ice was stored later to be used in interstate trains. Suit was
brought against the Express Company and against the
Southern Pacific Railroad on the theories now espoused by
the plaintiff herein. The District Court resolved this question against the plaintiff in a written opinion, 78 Fed.
Supp. 651. The United States Circuit Court of Appeals of
the Ninth Circuit affirmed this result in the following language:
"The judgment is affirmed on the grounds and
for the reasons stated in the opinion of the trial
court, 78 Fed. Supp. 651."
The Circuit Court opinion is to be found in 17 4 Fed. (2)
1022. Counsel for the plaintiff in their brief state that the
Circuit Court decision is without opinion (Plaintiff's Brief
p. 47). The fact appears to be that the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals adopted the opinion of the federal trial court so
that the trial court opinion is now the opinion of the Circuit
Court of Appeals. This case stands squarely for the proposition that an employe of the express company, such as Moleton, is not an employe of a railroad carrier. This holding is

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11
unmistakable in view of the following language used by the
trial court and adopted by the Circuit Court of Appeals :
"The terms of the Protective Service contract as
well as the manner of its performance indubitably
constitute the pArties independent contractors. The
Pacific Fruit Express Company performed with its
own employees at its own expense. No right of control over the manner and means of performance was
reserved to the railroads. To be sure certain conditions of performance and means of cooperation and
assistance are specified in the contract but these provisions,. directed to the successful accomplishment of
the contract's broad objective, do not invest the railroads with control of the method of performance.
Cases such as Pennsylvania Railroad Co'. v. Roth, 163
Fed. (2.) 161, in which the railroad company employed
a contractor to operate one of its railroad yards are
not apropos for there is absent here that substantial
degree of control over the manner and means of performance as was present in Pennsylvania Railroad
Co. v. Roth and like cases.
"The remedial and humanitarian purposes of
the Employers Liability Act in no way impel an interpretation of the contract in favor of an employment or agency relationship."
The essential proposition now urged by plaintiff to the
effect that the express company is nothing more than an
agent of the railroad company at Laramie, Wyoming, so
that its employes are in fact employes of the railroad company, was thus clearly rejected by the most recent opinion
dealing with the matter in the federal courts.

It is true that the court in the Gaulden case had another
basis upon which it could have decided that action in that
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at the time of the accident it was impossible to determine
the final destination of the ice being unloaded. In view of
the fact that carriers other than the Southern Pacific operated in the Bakersfield yards it became impossible to state
that Gaulden was injured while employed in the service of
any particular master's master. This is the distinction which
the plaintiff attempts to rely upon in the case at bar; but
the federal courts took occasion in the Gaulden case to consider the contention now urged by plaintiff as well and the
decision is so plainly a determination of the issue now raised
on this appeal that the effect of that opinion should be controlling in this case.
The case of Reynolds v. Addison Miller Co., 143 Wash.
271, 255 P. 110, is another ruling squarely in point and
squarely overruling the contentions now urged by the plaintiff. In that case the Addison Miller Company and a railroad company had made a contract whereby the railroad
leased to the Miller Company an icehouse and icing equipment. The Miller Company agreed to manufacture, sell and
deliver in the bunkers of refrigerator cars which the railroad might set out at the icing platform, all ice that was
required for use by the railroad. The railroad company had
the right to inspect the work performed by the Miller Company. The plaintiff was injured while engaged in icing a
car for the railroad company. Reynolds sued the Miller Company and the Railroad Company for his injuries, basing his
complaint on the theory that his cause of action was governed
by the Federal Employers' Liability Act. It is to be noted
that in this case there could be no contention that the opinion
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is based upon any uncertainty as to which carrier would
receive the benefit of the services of the employe of the icing
company. In the course of its opinion the Supreme Court of
Washington said :
"The question then first for consideration under
this act is whether at the time of the respondent's
injury he was an employee of a common carrier by
railroad. To answer this question it is necessary to
determine the effect of the contract between the Addison Miller Company and the Northern Pacific Railway Company. Under the authorities that contract
was valid and constituted the Addison Miller Company an independent contractor, and its employees
would not be employees of the Railway Company engaged in interstate commerce."
The court went on to cite the opinions of the Supreme Court
of the United States, commencing with the Robinson case,
supra, and determined that the plaintiff was not an employe
of the railroad company. It then took occasion to refer to a
previous opinion which it had written holding that a railway
company which had employed a construction company to do
particular work made all the employes of the construction
company employes of the railway company within the meaning of the Federal Employers' Liability Act. The Washington Supreme Court specifically held that this opinion had
been written without proper consideration and that there
was no proper legal basis for any such holding.
The two cases cited above dealing with the Pacific Fruit
Express Company and another company whose business was
substantially identical thereto stem from opinions of the
Supreme Court of the United States construing similar sit-
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uations in other industries closely connected with railroad
operations. The first such decision by the Supreme Court
of the United States was handed down in the case of Robinson v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company, supra. In that
case the plaintiff was a pullman porter on a car which was
being hauled by the defendant railroad company. He sued
for injuries sustained as a result of a collision which, it was
alleged, was occasioned by the negligence of the Railroad
Company. The defendant introduced in evidence a contract
between the plaintiff and the Pullman Company by which
the plaintiff released all railroad corporations over whose
line the cars of the Pullman Company might be operated
from all claims whatsoever arising out of personal injury
or death. The plaintiff contended that this contract was invalid and therefore inadmissible as in violation of the section of the Federal Employers' Liability Act which prohibited contracts or devices to exempt carriers from liability
created by the Act. It therefore became necessary for the
Supreme Court of the United States to determine whether
or not a pullman porter, nominally employed by the Pullman Company, was within the coverage of the Act. After
reviewing the facts of the relationship between the railroad
company and the Pullman Company, Mr. Justice Hughes,
speaking for the court, indicated that the words "employee"
and "employed" contained in the statute were used in their
natural sense, as heretofore stated. He further pointed out
that it was well known that there were on interstate trains
many persons engaged in various services for masters other
than the railroad company operating the train. He stated
that Congress, though familiar with this situation, did not

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

15
use any expression which could appropriately be taken to
indicate a purpose to include such persons within the coverage of the Act. The Supreme Court unanimously concluded
that the plaintiff was not an employe of the Railroad Company within the meaning of the Federal Employers' Liability
Act.
Counsel for the plaintiff have asserted that the decision
of the District Court in the case at bar makes it possible for
railroad companies to discharge all the various jobs necessary to the operation of trains through other corporations,
thus eliminating all employes from the coverage of the
federal statute. The fact is that certain work occasioned by
the operation of railroad trains has historically been performed by the railroad companies and other jobs incidental
to the operation of these trains have been performed by
other industries and companies. The Pullman Company is
one example of an industry affiliated with the operation of
railroad trains which historically has been handled by a
separate company whose employes are held to be outside the
coverage of the Federal Employers' Liability Act. We are
all familiar with the functions which pullman porters perform in the operation of a passenger train. Plaintiff suggests that Moleton was performing work which was the ·
work of the railroad company so that he was, in fact, the
employe of the railroad company. Can it fairly be said that
the work performed by a pullman porter is less the work of
the railroad company hauling the train on which he is in
service than was the work performed by Moleton for the
Pacific Fruit Express Company in the Laramie yards? It
is equally true as to each of these fact situations that the
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work performed by a pullman porter or the work performed
by Moleton is essential to the operation of interstate trains.
But the fact remains that in each instance this work is performed by a separate business organization distinct from
the railroad company and that the work is, in fact, done for
such separate business organization. The reason for this
historical separation of strict railroading from supplemental
services, however necessary the work in connection with such
supplemental services may be, is unimportant. The distinction exists, has been recognized by the Supreme Court of
the United States, and, as will be pointed out, has been approved by Congress.
Following the Robinson case the Supreme Court of the
United States was called upon to consider the matter more
fully in the case of Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co. v.
Bond, Administrator of Turner, 240 U. S. 449, 36 Sup. Ct.
403, 6·0 L. Ed. 735. In that case the deceased, William L.
Turner, was killed while unloading coal to be used by the
defendant railroad company at Enid, Oklahoma. His administrator brought suit against the railroad company alleging
that his death was caused by the negligence of the railroad
company and attempting to invoke the benefits of the Federal Employers' Liability Act. It appeared that T'urner had
performed work for the railroad company under a contract
requiring him to place all coal required by the company in
coal chutes so that the same could be discharged into the
engines of the railroad. He had other work consisting of
breaking the coal, unloading wood from cars to storage piles,
loading cinders from the right of way of the railroad company to cars at points designated by the railroad company,
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and unloading sand from cars furnished by the railroad
company at points designated by it. The contract required
considerable direction and instruction to Turner by agents
of the railroad company. The court in that case held Turner
to be an independent contractor as distinguished from an
employe of the railroad company, thus eliminating the Federal Employers' Liability Act from the case. Mr. Justice
McKenna, speaking for the court, used the following language in making such determination:
"There was, it is true, and necessarily, a certain
direction to be given by the company, or rather, we
should say, information given to Turner. But the
manner of the work was under his control, to be done
by him and those employed by him. He was responsible for its faithful performance and incurred the
penalty of the instant termination of the contract for
nonperformance. This was only a prudent precaution, indeed, necessary in view of the purpose 'of his
contract, which was to make provision for a daily SUPply of coal for the operation of the railroad. The
power given was one of control in a sense, but it was
not a detailed control of the actions of Turner or
those of his- employees. It was a judgment only over
results and a necessary sanction of the obligations
which he had incurred. It was not tantamount to the
control of an employee and a remedy against his incon1petency or neglect.

*

*

*

*

*

"The railroad company, the.refore, did not retain the right to direct the manner in which the business should be done, as well as the results to be accomplished, or, in other words did not retain control
not only of what should be done but how it should be
done."
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In the case of Hull, AdministrCLtrix of Hull, v. Philadelphia & Reading Ry. Co., 25·2 U. S. 475, 40 Sup. Ct. 358,
64 L. Ed. 670, the Supreme Court of the United States considered this problem again. In that case the deceased, Hull,
had for many years been in the general employ of the Western Maryland Railway Company. This Railway Company
operated a railroad from Hagerstown, Maryland to Lurgon,
Pennsylvania, at which point it connected with the railroad
owned by the Pennsylvania & Reading Ry. Co., the defendant. Through freight trains were operated from Hagerstown through Lurgon to Rutherford, Pennsylvania. Hull was
employed as a brakeman on such a train at the time he received his fatal injuries. His administratrix brought suit
against the Pennsylvania & Reading Ry. Co. claiming liability under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. The
through freight service along this line was conducted under
a written agreement between the two railway companies
which provided that each company was to supply motive
power in certain proportions, each company was to compensate the other for the use of the other's engines and
crews, but the division of earnings of the traffic was not
to be disturbed by the arrangement. Each company had the
right to enforce its objection to any unsatisfactory employe
of the other company running upon its tracks and the employes of each company, while upon the tracks of the other,
were subject to the rules, regulations, orders and discipline
of the owning company. The Supreme Court held that under
such circumstances Hull had not been transferred from the
employ of the Western Maryland Railway Company to that
of the defendant at the time when he was killed. The court
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reiterated the ruling in the Robinson case, supra, that the
words "employee" and "employed" were used in their natural sense and went on to state that since each company retained control of its own train crews, what was done on the
line of the other railroad company was done as part of the
L employees' duty to their general employer. This was true
even though the accident resulting in Hull's death occurred
while the train on which he was working was picking up
seven cars at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, on specific orders
and instructions of the yardmaster of the defendant company.

~

In the case of Wells Fargo & Co. v. Taylor, 254 U. S.
175,41 Sup. Ct. 93, 65 L. Ed. 205, the Supreme Court of the
United States reiterated its decisions respecting this matter
in a slightly different aspect. In that case Taylor, the plaintiff, sued Wells Fargo & Company for personal injuries
received through the derailment of an express car in which
he was working as the car was being hauled over the railroad of the St. Louis & San Francisco R. R. Company in interstate commerce. It appeared that Wells Fargo & Company was a common carrier by express and that it had a
contract with the railroad company giving the express company the exclusive privilege of conducting an express business on and over the railroad company's line. In this case
several other problems were treated by the court, but Mr.
Justice Van Devanter, speaking for the court, took occasion
to say:
"As respects the express company, it appears
not merely that Taylor was in its employ, but also that
the injuries were received while it was engaged and
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he was employed in interstate commerce; and so the
question is presented whether the act embraces a
common carrier by express which neither owns nor
operates a railroad, but uses and pays for railroad
transportation in the manner before shown. The District Court answered the question in the negative and
the Circuit Court of Appeals in the affirmative.
"In our opinion the words 'common carrier by
railroad,' as used in the act, mean one who operates
a railroad as a means·· of carrying for the public,that is to say, a railroad company acting as a common carrier. This view not only is in accord with
the ordinary acceptation of the words, but is enforced
by the mention of cars, engines, track, roadbed and
other property pertaining to a going railroad * * *."
This case represents another example of the decisions of the
Supreme Court of the United States to the effect that employment by a company closely allied with the railroad industry does not make such employe an employe of a common
carrier by rail so as to invoke the coverage of the Federal
Employers' Liability Act.
The next determination by the Supreme Court of the
United States on this matter was in the case of Linstead,
Executrix, v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co., 276, U.S. 28,
48 Sup. Ct. 248, 72 L. Ed. 467. This is the case so heavily
relied upon by the plaintiffin the case at bar. 'In that case
the deceased, Linstead, was a conductor in the employ of the
Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Company, known as the Big Four. He was working upon a
freight train running upon the defendant Chesapeake & Ohio
Railway Company's tracks in interstate commerce. The facts
were that the Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company had a
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track from the east to Cincinnati, Ohio, where it delivered
cars to the Big Four Company for delivery to the northwest.
It was convenient for both railroads to make an arrangement
by which the Big Four Company loaned to the Chesapeake &
Ohio Railway Company equipment and· a train crew to take
freight trains from Stevens, Kentucky to the Big Four Company at Riverside, Ohio, over the rails of the Chesapeake &
Ohio. The defendant Chesapeake & Ohio did not pay the
Big Four Company any rental for the loan of the locomotive,
caboose or crew, but paid for this service by rendering a
reciprocal service of similar nature. Suit was brought by
the executrix of Linstead to recover damages for his death
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act against the
Chesapeake & Ohio. In this case the Supreme Court of the
United States held that the deceased was in the special emnominally employed by
ployment of the defendant, though
\
the Big Four, and sustained recovery under the federal
act. It is to be noted that the court relied upon the case of
StUJtUlmrd Oil Co. v. Anderson, 212 U. S. 215, 29· Sup. Ct.
252, 53 L. Ed. 480, which had been cited by the Supreme
Court of the United States in the opinions heretofore discussed and that the Hull case was distinguished. We have
no quarrel with the ruling in the Linstead case but certainly
this case is not in point in the case at bar for the following
reasons:
1.

The work in which Linstead was engaged at
the tim:e of his death was not work which
historically has been performed by companies other than railroad companies, but was
the actual operation of a train in interstate
commerce.
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2.

The work which was being done by Linstead
at the time of his death was work being done
under the rules of the Chesapeake & Ohio
Railway Company and it was done under the
immediate supervision and direction of a
trainmaster of the Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company.

The court took occasion to make the following comments
in passing upon this matter:
"'The master's responsibility cannot be extended
beyond the limits of the master's work. If the servant is doing his own work or that of some other,
the master is not answerable for his negligence in the
performance of it.

"'It sometimes happens that one wishes a certain work to be done for his benefit and neither has
persons in his employ who can do it nor is willing to
take such persons into his general service. He may
then enter into an agreement with another. If that
other furnishes him with men to do the work and
places them under his exclusive control in the performance of it, those men became pro hac vice the
servants of him to whom they are furnished. But, on
the other hand, one may prefer to enter into an
agreement with another that that other, for a consideration, shall himself perform the work through
servants of his own selection, retaining the direction
and control of them. In the first case, he to whom
the workmen are furnished is responsible for their
negligence in the conduct of the work, because the
work is his work and they are for the time his workmen. In the second case, he who agrees to furnish the
completed work through servants over whom heretains control is responsible for their negligence in
the conduct of it, because, though it is done for the
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ultimate benefit of the other, it is still in its doing his
own work. To determine whether a given case falls
within the one class or the other we must inquire
whose is the work being performed, a question which
is usually answered by ascertaining who has the
power to control and direct the servants in the performance of their work. Here we must carefully distinguish between authoritative direction and control,
and mere suggestion as to details or the necessary
cooperation, where the work furnished is part of a
larger undertaking.'" Quoting from the Anderson
case.
We submit that this case is also authority for the defendants'
position in the case at bar because the most that can be said
to be shown by the evidence at the trial is that the Union
Pacific Railroad Company transmitted to the Pacific Fruit
Express Company directions (originally given by the shipper) as to the heater services to be performed. Certainly
in the case at bar there is an absence of proof that the Union
Pacific had the power to control and direct Moleton and
other employes of the Pacific Fruit Express Company in the
performance of their work. This remains true though the
ultimate benefit of the work performed by Moleton and his
fellow employes was conferred upon the railroad company,
or perhaps, more properly speaking, the shipper of the merchandise in the cars upon which Moleton worked.

It appears from the evidence that the only connection
which the Union Pacific Railroad Company had with Moleton
was as follows: Before a train would arrive at Laramie the
Union Pacific conductor on that train would compile a switch
list showing every car in the train. This list would be com-
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piled from waybills in his possession, which waybills showed
among other things the instructions originally given by the
shipper as to the heating service to be furnished. The conductor would telegraph this switch list to the railroad company employes at Laramie. Those employes would make sufficient copies of this switch list that one or more could be
furnished to Pacific Fruit Express employes, thus passing
on the information as to the requirements of service for
particular cars. From then on the Union Pacific had no
more concern with the manner or method in which the work
was done and no more control over the same than does any
member of this court. We respectfully submit that the fact
that the railroad company desired to have the work performed by the Pacific Fruit Express Company ultimately
accomplished does not make the work done by the Pacific
Fruit Express Company the work of the railroad company
as contended/ for in plaintiff's brief. The L~"nstead case
specifically sustains our contention in the following language:
"In the second case (relationship of independent
contractor) he who agrees to furnish the completed
work through servants over whom he retains control
is responsible for their negligence in the conduct of
it, because, though it is done for the ultimate benefit
of the other, it is still in its doing his own work."
If the conveying of the information contained in the switch
list in the case at bar to the Pacific Fruit Express Company
is enough to make any employe of the Pacific Fruit Express
Company doing work on cars covered by the switch list an
employe of the railroad company, then no service rendered
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by any third person to the railroad company falls without
the Federal Employers' Liability Act. In the course of its
.business the railroad company may choose to purchase railroad cars which are to be constructed by "X" company according to rigid specifications. The "X" company will be
directed by the railroad company to manufacture such cars
according to plans and specifications furnished. Would it
be a normal and usual interpretation of this relationship
to state that employes of the "X" company engaged in manufacturing the cars were employes of the railroad company?
The railroad company may call upon "Y" company to furnish towel service so that mechanics of the railroad company
may wash their hands at their place of work. By reason
of t~e fact that the _railroad company may direct the "Y"
company to place its roller towel in a certain position on the
railroad company's premises, to replace the towels at designated intervals, and to furnish satisfactory service in the
way of repairs to the mechanism for operating the towel
service, can it reasonably be maintained that the employe of
the "Y" towel company engaged in this work is, in fact, an
employe of the railroad company? Yet what the evidence
shows was the extent of the Union Pacific's contribution
to the supervision of Moleton in the case at bar is less than
the contribution to the supervision of the employes mentioned in either of the foregoing situations.
Counsel for the plaintiff state, at page 29· of their brief,
that the question as to the relationship of employer and employe "is not the control over the employe but is whose work
is being done." In the Linstead case, supra, upon which
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counsel for plaintiff so heavily rely, Mr. Justice Taft, speaking for the court, said :
"To determine whether a given case falls within
one class (employment) or the other (independent
contractor) we must inquire whose is the work being
performed, a question which is usually answered by
ascertaining who has the power to control and direct
the servants in the performance of their work."
The cases heretofore mentioned conclusively establish
that under the facts of the case at bar Moleton was an employe of the Pacific Fruit Express Company and not an employe of the railroad company. The decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States require such a holding and, in
addition, the following cases decided by other courts adhere
to the same proposition :

Stevenson v. Lake Terminal Railroad Company,
42· Fed. (2) 3157,
Docheney v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company,
60 Fed. (2) 808, certiorari denied 77 L. Ed.
573,

Pollo·ck v. Minneapolis & St. Louis R. R. Co., 166
N. W. 641, certiorari denied 6·3 L. Ed. 421,
Taylor v. New York Central Railroad Company,
62 N. E. (2) 777, certiorari denied 326. U. S.
786. This case was decided in 1945.
Plaintiff relies upon the case of Jones v. George F. Getty
Oil Company, 92 Fed. (2) 2,55. We call to the court's attention the fact that this case presented no question involving
the Federal Employers' Liability Act in any manner whatso-
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ever. The only question involved was as to the applicability
of the New Mexico Compensation Act. This case is notremotely similar to the Moleton case on its facts. It appears
that the work which Jones was doing at the_ time of his
injury was repairing wells owned by the defendant and operated by the defendant, the main portion of the work being
done by the defendant with the plaintiff assisting therein
under the general supervision of the defendant.
Plaintiff also relies upon the Cimorelli, Roth and Barlion cases, all decided by the same court and all cited at page
37 of his brief. In the Cimorelli case it appeared that the
defendant railroad company had hired a contractor to operate certain yards at Dock Junction, Pennsylvania. The
plaintiff was an employe of the contractor and sued the railroad under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. In that
case the court determined that the action fell within the
federal statute, relying upon the following factors:
1.

The defendant selected the place in the yards
and the time when the work was to be performed.

2.

The defendant determined the amount of
equipment and the number of employes to
be furnished by the contractor.

3.

The defendant under its arrangement with
the contractor had the right to approve in advance every item of cost and the necessity
for the purchase of every item of equipment,
and also the amount of the salary or wages
of every employe of the contractor, and in addition, the contractor was to be paid on a
cost-plus basis.
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The distinction between that case and the case at bar is so
obvious as to require no further elaboration.
In the Roth case the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
followed its previous opinion in the Cimorelli case upon
substantially the same facts, pointing out that each case
must be decided on its own facts and circumstances and that
ordinarily no one feature of the relationship between the
plaintiff and the defendant is determinative of the employment question. It appeared in that case that the contract between the railroad company and the contractor who
nominally, at least, employed the plaintiff, was general and
indefinite as to the nature of the work to be done and required that the contractor perform such other work
incident to the operations as might be requested by
the company. It further appeared that the contractor
made changes in the work pursuant to the orders of employes of the railroad company, and upon this basis the
Sixth Circuit Court apparently felt that the railroad company had retained such control of the work being done as to
require a holding that the relationship between the railroad
company and the contractor was that of agency, making the
contractor's employes also employes of the railroad company.
This case is not similar to the case at bar on its facts and is
no authority for the plaintiff's present contention.
The Barlion case arose when Barlion suffered personal
injuries in the same yards as those in which Roth had been
injured. Barlion was injured while working for a company
doing the same work as the contractor in the Roth case and
the contract was substantially the same in the two cases.
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The court again pointed out that each controversy must be
determined on its own peculiar facts and held that the railroad had sufficient right of control to require a holding that
the contractor was an agent of the railroad company, so that
its employes became employes of the railroad company.
Again, the facts are not similar to those in the Moleton case
and the case is not in point on the question involved in the
present appeal.
Before concluding this phase of our brief we would like
to point out to this court a further factor which seems to
us conclusive of the plaintiff's contentions on this particular
point. As was stated by the trial court in the Gaulden case,
cited supra, during the forty year life of the F'ederal Employers' Liability Act Congress, while liberalizing its benefits, has not seen fit to extend the scope of the statute beyond railroading in its true sense. Although Congress took
occasion to amend the Federal Employers' Liability Act in
1939 to broaden the coverage of the Act to those employes
whose work for railroad carriers substantially affected interstate commerce, it did not see fit to enlarge the scope of
the statute to cover those industries allied with the railroad
industry but historically separate therefrom. It must be
assumed upon familiar principles of statutory construction
that Congress was aware of the interpretation placed upon
the original act by the Supreme Court in the Robinson,
Bond, Hull and Wells Fargo cases, supra, and was satisfied
with that interpretation.

State v. Roberts, 56 Utah 136; 190 P. 351;
Annotation-146 A. L. R. 923.
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because the application of this provision depended upon the
plaintiff's employment. In other words, if the plaintiff is
correct in the proposition that he is an employe of the Union
Pacific Railroad Company as urged in his Point No. I, he
has no necessity to rely upon the provisions of Section 55
of the act. If he is not an employe of a common carrier by
railroad, such as the Union Pacific, then he is not entitled
to the protection of Section 55. The courts, moreover, have
specifically overruled the contention now urged by the plaintiff. In the Bond case, supra, the exact argument now urged
by the plaintiff was presented to the Supreme Court of the
United States and that court again laid at rest plaintiff's
contention in the following language :
"We do not think that the contract can be regarded as an evasion of Section 5· of the Employers'
Liability Act, which provides 'that any contract, rule,
regulation or device whatsoever, the purpose and intent of which shall be to enable any common carrier
to exempt itself from any liability created by this
act, shall to that extent be void * * *'
"Turner was something more than a mere shoveler of coal under a superior's command. He was an
independent employer of labor, conscious of this own
power to direct and willing to assume the responsibility of direction and to be judged by its results.
This is manifes.t from the contract under review and
from the cooperage contract; it is also manifest from
his contracts with the other companies to whose industries the railroad company's tracks extended. We
certainly cannot say that he was incompetent to assume such relation and incur its consequences."
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In the Gaulden case, supra, the federal courts overruled
plaintiff's contention in the following language:
"Section 5 of the Federal Employers' Liability
Act, 45 USC 55, provides as follows :
'Any contract, rule, regulation, or device whatsoever, the purpose or intent of which shall be to enable any common carrier to exempt itself from any
liability created by this chapter, shall to that extent
be void.'
"The creation of the Pacific Fruit Express Company, although intended to further the transportation business of its two railroad stockholders, occurred before the Act was passed. There is therefore
no basis for a charge that creation of Pacific Fruit
Express Company violated Section 5. Chicago, R. I.
etc. v. Bond, 240 U. S. 449, Robinson v. B. & 0., 2;37
U. S. 84; Wells Fargo v. Taylor, supra.
"It is suggested that the so-called indemnity
clause of the Protective Service Contract amounts to
a violation of Section 5. But inasmuch as this clause
is one merely of indemnity, it does not have the effect
of exempting the railroads from their liability as common carriers under the Act. Hence in no sense may
it be considered a violation of Section 5."

For a well considered State court opinion to the same
effect see the case of Drago v. Central R. Co., 106 A. 803,
a New Jersey case. In that case the plaintiff was injured
while transferring steel tires from a railroad car to a lighter
at the water front. terminal of the Central Railroad Company
of New Jersey. He sued under the F'ederal Employers' Liability Act but was denied recovery. Plaintiff contended that
he was entitled to the benefits of Section 5 of the Act ( 45
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U. 8. C. A. 55). The New Jersey Court made the following
observations :
"We think that no evasion of the provisi_on that
'any contract, rule, regulation, or device whatsoever,
the purpose or intent of which shall be to enable any
common carrier to exempt itself from any liability
created by this act shall to that extent be void,' results from the making of a contract (as here) by an
interstate railway carrier with an independent stevedoring corporation under which the work of handling
the railroad company's freight from cars to boats and
from boats to cars at its water front terminal is to
be performed by such independent contract, even
though the latter expressly assumes all liability for
injury to its employes while employed upon the premises of the railroad company."
The court then cited the Bond case, supra, and went on to
conclude as follows :
"In the present case the Stevedoring Corporation
occupied precisely the same position with respect to
the defendant that Turner in the Bond Case occupied
to the railroad. Since the independent contractor himself could not recover because not an employe of the
railroad, it follows that the plaintiff here cannot recover because not an employe of the railroad. Since,
under the Bond Case, a contract very similar in terms
to that in the present case was not a contract in violation of section 5, it cannot be said that the contract
under consideration is in violation of that section.
"As was said in effect in the Bond Case, we cannot say that the contract was one which the parties
were incompetent to make. By it the defendant railroad did not undertake to relieve itself from responsibility as a common carrier to its patrons or the public,
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and hence we are not now concerned with such a case.
The defendant railroad evidently considered, for one
reason or another, that it would be more satisfactory
to have its cars unloaded by stevedores employed and
directed by an independent contractor. In entering
into the contract for that purpose it intended of
course to relieve itself of the burden of dealing with
and being responsible for this class of employes. But
that, as we have seen, it had the legal right to do."
In view of the foregoing cases we do not believe plaintiff's counsel are justified in their sweeping statement to
the effect that the arrangement in the case at bar is a contract or device in violation of the Federal Employers' Liability Act. Before a legitimate business arrangement between a railroad and any other responsible company, by
terms of which the second company becomes an independent contractor in its dealings with the railroad, is declared
to be null and void as a violation of Section 5 of the F'ederal
Employers' Liability Act it seems to us that we should have
some better authority than the unsupported statements
of the plaintiff's counsel.

POINT NO. III
By Point No. III of the plaintiff's brief he asserts that
the defendant Pacific Fruit Express Company was a common carrier by railroad in interstate commerce. The importance of this contention lies in the fact that the defendant Pacific Fruit Express Company has admitted Moleton
to have been its employe at the time of his injuries; consequently, if the Pacific Fruit Express Company was a com-
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mon carrier by railroad in interstate commerce at that time,
Moleton's cause of action against the Pacific Fruit Express
Company would be governed by the Federal Employers' Liability Act. Again plaintiff states, without any semblance
of authority for his position, that the conclusion is inescapable that the defendant express company was a common
carrier by railroad in interstate commerce because it was
engaged in a joint enterprise with the Union Pacific, which
was admittedly a common carrier by railroad. Despite this
assertion by plaintiff's counsel, we call to the court's attention that the Supreme Court of the United States has been
able to escape this conclusion and, in fact, to rule to the contrary on every occasion when the matter has been presented
to it. In the case of Wells Fargo & Co. v. Taylor, cited supra,
the Supreme Court had occasion to determine whether or
not Wells Fargo & Company was a common carrier by railroad within the meaning of the act. It appeared in that case
that Wells Fargo & Company transacted express business on
and over the railroad company's road under a contract giving it the exclusive right to conduct such business over the
railroad and obligating the railroad company to refrain
from competing. The railroad company agreed to transport
by suitable cars to be provided by it and attached to its passenger trains all express matter of the express company
and the express company agreed to make payments determined by a percentage of its gross earnings and to assume
certain risks of loss. There was an integration of two businesses much ·more complete than is presented in the case
at bar. It further appears that the plaintiff urged that the
contract between the railroad company and Wells Fargo &
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Company showed a co-proprietorship or sort of partnership
between them which made him an employe of both. In overruling his contentions the Supreme Court of the United
States said :
"In his declaration in the state court Taylor did
not claim that he was in the employ of the railroad
company, and his judgment was not obtained on that
theory. Here it is shown with certainty that he was
not in that company's employ. True he urges that
the contract between the two companies shows a coproprietorship or sort of partnership between them
which made him an employee of both; but the contract
discloses no basis for the claim or for distinguishing
his case from that of the Pullman porter recently
before us.' Robinson v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co'.,
237 U. S. 84. Here the businesses of the companies
concerned were quite as distinct in point of control
and otherwise as they were there. That here the railroad company provided the express car is not material, for it is measurably equalized by other differences. In both cases the railroad company provided the
motive power and the train operatives. The messenger here, like the porter there, was on the train as an
employee, not of the railroad company, but of another
by whom he was employed, directed and paid, and
at whose will he was to continue in service or be discharged.

*

*

*

*

*

"As Taylor was not an employee of the railroad
company and the express company was not within
the Employers' Liability Act, it follows that the act
has no bearing on the liability of either company or
on the validity of the messenger's agreement."
In the case of Reynolds v. Addis'on Miller Comparny et
al., cited supra, the Supreme Court of Washington was like-
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wise able to escape the conclusion demanded by the plaintiff. It is to be noted that the Addison Miller Company was
doing work identical with the general work performed by
the Pacific Fruit Express Company. In passing upon the
contention now raised by plaintiff, the court said:
"Under the authorities that contract was valid
and constituted the Addison Miller Company an independent contractor, and its employes would not be
employes of the railway company engaged in interstate commerce; nor would the Addison Miller Company itself be within the terms of the Federal Employers' Liability Act."
In the Robinson case, cited supra, the Supreme Court
of the United States held, in substance, that the Pullman
Company was not a common carrier by railroad within the
meaning of the act. This decision was the basis of the court's
opinion in the case of Taylor v. New York Central R. R. Co.,
cited supra, where the Court of Appeals of New York said:
"Nor does plaintiff as an employee of the Pullman Company come within the federal act and escape
the controls of the workmen's compensation law. We
find no express holding in the cases as to whether or
not an opera tor of parlor and sleeping cars is liable
to its porters under the federal act, but the answer
seems plain enough. In Wells, Fargo & Co. v. Taylor,
the Supreme Court, denying the applicability of the
federal act to workers on the cars of a railway express company said: 'In our opinion the words common carrier by railroad as used in the act mean one
who operates a railroad as a means of carrying for
the public-that is to say, a railroad company acting
as a common carrier.' "
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In the Gaulden case, cited supra, plaintiff's contention
was again overruled. The trial court said : ·
"Plaintiff contends that the Pacific Fruit Express Company is a common carrier by railroad and
hence within the reach of the Federal Employers'
Liability Act. The Court holds to the contrary. The
act itself subjects freight common carriers by railroad, while engaging in commerce between any of the
several states or territories, to liability in damages
to any person suffering injury while employed by
such carrier in such commerce. 45 USC 51. There
does not seem to be any doubt at all that the business
of renting refrigerator cars to railroads or shippers
and providing protective service in the transportation
of perishable commodities is not of itself tha~ of a
common carrier by railroad. Ellis v. Interstate Commerce Commisioner, 23~ U. S. 434; U. S. v. Fruit
Growers Express Co., 279 U.S. 363; Wells Fargo &
Co. v. Taylor, 254 U. S. 175 ; U. S. ex rei. Chicago
Refrigerator Company v. Interstate Commerce
Comm., 265 U. S. 292; Reynolds v. Addison Miller
Co., 143 Wash. 271, 255 Pac. 110.
"The Federal Employers' Liability Act was
amended in 1939. At that time, despite earlier decisions, some of which have been cited, no effort was
made to include refrigerator companies within its
terms. Congressional inactivity in that regard must
be given its usual implication, i. e. acquiescence in
the judicial rulings. Federal legislation concerning
the social security of employees employed in Interstate Commerce specially included employees of Refrigerator Companies within the meaning of the term
carrier, thus indicating Congressional awareness of
the actualities. Thus the terms of the statute, plus
the judicial interpretations of its meaning and the
obvious knowledge of the Congress over a long period
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of time as to such judicial pronouncements, make it
abundantly clear that Pacific Fruit Express Company
itself is not a common carrier by rail and not subject
to the provisions of the Act."
The evidence in the case at bar does not even suggest
that the Pacific Fruit Express Company was (1) a common
carrier, or (2) that it was such common carrier by railroad.
There is no evidence that the Pacific Fruit Express Company accepts shipments from anyone and as a matter of fact
it does not accept shipments. The cases mentioned above
clearly indicate that there is no legal support of any nature
whatsoever for the proposition that the Pacific Fruit Express Company is a common carrier by railroad within the
meaning of the Federal Employers' Liability Act.
POINT NO. IV
The fourth point argued in plaintiff's brief asserts that
sufficient evidence was introduced in the case to support
a finding that the defendants were negligent and that such
negligence contributed in whole or in part to the injuries
suffered by the plaintiff. In support thereof plaintiff has
cited six of the recent decisions of the Supreme Court of
the United States construing the Federal Employers' Liability Act. He concedes that these cases are not in point on
the facts of this particular case.
In the event that this court determines the F'ederal Employers' Liability Act to be inapplicable to plaintiff's claim,
it will be unnecessary to consider Point No. IV at all; and
we therefore believe that no discussion of Point No. IV of
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plaintiff's brief should be required. But to complete our
answer to the four points urged by Moleton we desire to
make the following observations on Point No. IV of plaintiff's brief.
We concede that the plaintiff introduced sufficient evidence to n1ake a jury question of negligence against the
Pacific Fruit Express Company if Moleton's fall was due
to carbon monoxide poisoning. The issue which we raised
by our motion for nonsuit and by our argument thereon was
based upon the insufficiency of the evidence presented to
show that the plaintiff's fall and the consequent injuries
suffered therefrom were contributed to or caused by such
carbon monoxide poisoning. Unless the evidence is sufficient
to make a jury question upon the fact of Moleton's fall having in some manner been contributed to by carbon monoxide
poisoning, there could be no causal relationship between the
negligence alleged and the injuries complained of since all.
of the plaintiff's theories of liability revolve around the
basic premise that carbon monoxide poisoning rendered
Moleton unconscious and thus produced the fall.
No question is here presented involving any peculiar
legalistic meaning of the term "proximate cause." The point
which we now wish to make to this court is that the evidence
fails to show that carbon monoxide poisoning was in fact a
cause of plaintiff's injuries. There is no direct testimony
in the record to the effect that plaintiff suffered such poisoning at the time of the accident; and if his case is sufficient
to go to a jury on this matter it can only be held sufficient
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on the theory that a jury could properly draw some sort of
inference that Moleton's fall was so caused.
We are not unmindful of the decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States in the Lavender and Tenant cases
cited in plaintiff's brief. These cases do hold in substance
that jurors must be permitted a certain amount of speculation and conjecture in choosing what seems to them the more
reasonable as between two or more conflicting inferences;
but we do not understand that the Supreme Court of the
United States has ever receded from the proposition which
found expression in the case of Atchi'3on, Topeka & Santa
Fe Railway· Co. v. Toops~ 281 U. S. 3S1, 50 Sup. Ct. 281, 74
L. Ed. 89-6, where Mr. Justice Stone, speaking for that court,
stated that the type of inference which a jury would be permitted to draw must be a reasonable one. We believe that
the Lavender and Tenant cases go no further th3;n to state
that a jury must be permitted to choose between conflicting
reasonable inferences; and to further state that it is of no
consequence to a court whether the jury chooses the more
reasonable or less reasonable as between such inferences.
But it still remains for every trial court or appellate court
to decide whether or not as between conflicting inferences
one is so unlikely as to be unreasonable, so that it could
not properly be the basis for a jury verdict. In any case
where the inference sought to be drawn to support liability
is so unsubstantial as to fail to commend itself to any reasonable person no jury should be permitted to draw the same.
So in the case at bar if the inference of carbon monoxide
poisoning as a contributing factor to the accident is so weak
and unsubstantial as to be unreasonable, the jury should
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not have been permitted to draw the inference in support
of a verdict for the plaintiff. Each case must, of course, be
viewed on its own facts and the reasonableness of the inference sought to be sustained must always be considered in the
light thereof.
In the instant case no one can rule out with rigid certainty the possibility that Moleton's fall may have been
caused by carbon monoxide poisoning, but consideration of
the evidence leads us to the conclusion that any inference
to the effect that such poisoning was a cause of the accident
is so weak, unsubstantial and unreliable that it could not
properly be accepted by reasonable mert and should not
therefore be submitted to a jury for determination. The
following facts, either shown by the evidence or within the
judicial knowledge of this court, seem to us important and
to lead to that conclusion :
( 1) Carbon monoxide is lighter than air ;
(2) The hatch in the top of the bunker of the
car from which Moleton fell had been open
for several minutes before Moleton entered
the bunker;
( 3) Moleton himself had been in the open air
for enough time after working in the bunkers of the first two cars which he reached on
the day of the accident that any possible
effects of gas in the bunkers of those cars
should have been dissipated. This is demonstrated by the fact that FDEX9084, which
was the second car from the west end of the
train, was three car lengths removed from
the nearest other heater cars in which the
plaintiff worked on the day of the accident;
(See Exhibit 4~)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

44
( 4) Moleton was in the bunkers. of the three cars
a total of less than six minutes and in the
bunker of FDEX9084 only a minute or two;
( 5) There is no evidence that carbon monoxide

gas ever caused anyone difficulty under circumstances such as outlined above and made
apparent by the evidence in this case;
( 6) The symptom of carbon monoxide poisoning observed by the lay witnesses is dizziness
felt upon reaching fresh air, but Moleton
experienced no such symptom after leaving
any of the bunkers on the day of the accident
and, in fact, displayed no symptom of carbon monoxide poisoning whatsoever;
(7) There are numerous other possible explanations as to the cause of the accident; two
which readily occur are as follows.: (a)
Moleton might have fainted from causes
wholly dependent upon his own physical condition; (b) Moleton might have slipped and
fallen without losing consciousness at all;
and his recollections thereof may be lost due
to the shock he sustained as a result of the
fall. Such other possible explanations do
not, of course, eliminate the possibility that
carbon monoxide poisoning contributed to
the fall and the consequent injuries; but
these other possibilities must be taken into
account in determining whether the inference of gas poisoning is, in fact, a reasonable
inference;
( 8) No medical evidence was offered by the
plaintiff to demonstrate that he had ever
displayed any symptoms. of carbon monoxide
poisoning. In fact, no medical evidence of
any kind was offered by the plaintiff to sup-
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port his theory as to how the accident happened or even to prove that the accident
could have happened as the plaintiff now
claims by his brief that it did.
In view of the extent to which the Supreme Court of the
United States has broadened the field within which a jury
may be permitted to conjecture and speculate as to matters
of negligence and causation, it seems to us that it would be
a useless thing to attempt to refer this court to cases of bygone days dealing with situations similar to this case. The
cases of fifteen years ago are, for the most part, unreliable
guideposts in deciding matters of negligence and causation
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act in view of the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. But nevertheless, we are of the opinion that careful examination of the
evidence in this case shows the inference that carbon monoxide poisoning contributed to plaintiff's fall to be so unlikely,
unsubstantial and unreasonable as to fall far short of any acceptable standards of proof recognized by the law. To attribute Moleton's fall to gas poisoning is not to draw a reasonable inference. It is just plain guessing and it is an unreasonable guess at that. This seems to us to require a holding that the plaintiff has failed in his proof even in view
of the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States
cited by the plaintiff.
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CONCLUSION
We respectfully submit that Moleton's claim does not
fall within the provisions of the Federal Employers' Liability
Act for the following reasons : ( 1) He was not an employe
of the Union Pacific Railroad Company; and (2) he was
employed by the Pacific Fruit Express Company which is
not a common carrier for hire and which is not, therefore,
subject to the act. But even in the event that this court
should rule that the act was applicable, we do not believe
that the plaintiff offered sufficient evidence that a jury
could be permitted to find that his injuries were caused in
whole or in part by the negligence of the defendants. Therefore, the judgment should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
BRYAN P. LEVERICH,
M. J. BRONSON,
A. U. MINER,
HOWARD F. CORAY,

Counsel for
Defendarnts and Respondents.
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